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ABSTRACT
RISK PERCEPTIONS OF INSTRUCTOR AND CANDIDATE
PILOTS REGARDING HELICOPTER OPERATIONS
Avcıoğlu, Ali
M.B.A., Department of Management
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dilek Önkal-Atay
August 2002
This thesis investigates risk perceptions of instructor and candidate pilots. Incidents
and flight scenarios concerning helicopter operations were given to participants to
explore differences in risk perceptions.  In contrast to the majority of earlier studies, the
present study concludes that experts and nonexperts do not vary much in their
evaluation of the riskiness.  In addition, experienced pilots are more prone to take risks
voluntarily than inexperienced pilots.  Findings are discussed and limitations of current
study are provided.
Keywords: Risk perception; expert judgment; helicopter operations
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ÖZET
ÖĞRETMEN PİLOTLARIN VE PİLOT ADAYLARININ
HELİKOPTER OPERASYONLARIYLA İLGİLİ
RİSK ALGILAMALARI
Ali AVCIOĞLU
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İŞLETME FAKÜLTESİ
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Dilek Önkal-Atay
Ağustos, 2002
Bu tez, öğretmen pilotlarla pilot adaylarının risk algılamalarını araştırmaktadır.  Risk
algılamasındaki farklılıkları tespit etmek maksadıyla, ankete katılanlara helikopter
operasyonları ile ilgili olaylar ve uçuş senaryoları verilmiştir.  Daha önceki birçok
çalışmanın aksine, bu çalışmada uzmanların ve uzman olmayanların risk algılamalarında
çok farklılık göstermedikleri sonucuna varılmıştır.  Ancak, belirli koşullar altında uzman
pilotların uzman olmayanlara oranla daha çok risk alma eğiliminde oldukları
gözlenmiştir.  Çalışmanın neticeleri ve kısıtlamalar tezde sunulmuştur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Risk algılaması; uzman değerlendirmesi; helikopter operasyonları
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Most psychological studies on risk are directed finding factors that may
potentially affect risk perception. There are three basic approaches studying risk
perception.  These are revealed preference approach, psychometric approach, and
cultural theory.  Revealed preference approach claims that, by trial and error,
society arrives at an essentially optimum balance between the risks and benefits.
Revealed preference considers that present risk level in the society is acceptable,
because we are tolerating it. This method provided a driving force for later research
in this area.
The assumption of revealed preference that past behaviour is a good indicator of
present behaviours was criticized, and deficiencies of revealed preference approach
have motivated researchers to conduct studies using questionnaires to measure the
people’s attitudes toward risks, -so-called psychometric approach or expressed
preferences. In psychometric studies, respondents are asked to express their
2preferences for a range of hazards.  Studies showed that perceived risk is
quantifiable and predictable; and that people tend to view current risk levels as
unacceptably high for the activities given in studies.  Researchers use factor
analysis method to study risk perception and claim that public risk perception has
two dimensions: dread risks and unknown risks.  Dread risks are the ones whose
severity is believed to be uncontrollable.  Catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal,
inequitable, threatening to future generations are some characteristics of the risk
labelled as dread. Unknown risks are hazards unobservable by the public.
Observability, knowledge, familiarity are some characteristics of the risk labelled as
unknown.
Another major attempt to explain risk perception is the “cultural theory” that
tries to link risk perception with social and institutional arrangements, unlike the
psychometric perspective. The claim of the cultural theory is that individuals’
attitudes toward risk and danger are heterogeneous and may vary according to
cultural biases. Douglas explains risk perception with reference to grid-group theory
(Douglas, 1978, cf Wilkinson 2001). According to theory, people are categorized
into four cultural groups: hierarchists, egalitarians, fatalists, and individualists.
Hierarchists like organized society and worry about risks that affect authority and
social order. Egalitarians prefer a world in which power and wealth are more evenly
distributed.  Fatalists are prone to think that what happens in life is predetermined
and cannot be changed.  Individualists are worried about factors that could threat
the markets such as war and recession.
3   It is argued that people use some heuristics to cope with risky situations.
Commonly used heuristics are  availability, anchoring and adjustment, and
representativeness.  According to availability heuristic, one’s judgement about the
relative frequency of an event usually depends on the degree to which it is
remembered.  Easily imagined are judged to be more probable. It is a lot easier to
think of words which start with the letter K than of words where K is in the third
position.  However, a typical selection of text contains twice as many words in
which K is in the third position than words which start with K.  In anchoring and
adjustment process, people make judgments by starting at an initial value (anchor)
and later adjust it to reach a final value as a decision.  According to
representativeness, The subjective probability of an event is determined by the
degree to which it is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population and
it reflects the outstanding features of the process by which it is generated.
The focus of present study is the perception of risk by experts and non-experts.
Considerable amount of research has been conducted so far to elicit the differences
of risk perception between experts and laypeople.  Kraus et al. (1991) surveyed
toxicologists and laypeople to demonstrate discrepancies between these groups with
regard to risk perception in chemicals and concluded that experts and laypeople
differed in risk perception. Laypeople had negative attitudes toward chemicals but
positive attitudes and perceptions toward prescription drugs.    Flynn et al. (1993)
also examined the differences of risk perception between experts and laypeople
with regard to high-level nuclear waste repositories.   Researchers concluded that
4remarkable differences exist between experts and laypeople regarding the
perception of radioactive waste risks.  According to this study, experts perceive
these risks as lower than public.
By contrast, some studies shows that discrepancies between experts and lay
sample are minor; moreover, Wright et al. (2000) express that “experts can rate
some risks as equal to, or even greater than, ratings given by members of the
general public” (p. 682).  Wright et al. (2000) investigated on expert and laypeople
perceptions concerning the U.K. oil and gas industry and showed that experts and
laypeople shared more similarities.  Experts were also sensitive to risky situations,
and they did not judge the events as less risky than laypeople. Another example is
the study of McDaniels et al. (1997) concerning ecological risk to water
environments. They found that in 22 of 33 given hazards, there were no significant
differences between expert and lay samples with regard to risk assessments.
Our study investigates differences in perceptions of experts and non-experts
toward risky events in Army Aviation concerning helicopter flights. Aviation
history is full of accidents and tragic losses.  Since the late 1950s, the drive to
reduce the accident rate has yielded safety level to a point where it is now safer to
fly than to drive a car.  Still, while the aviation accident rate has declined, the cost
of aviation accidents in both lives and money has steadily risen.  As a result, the
effort to reduce the accident rate has assumed an increased importance within both
military and civilian aviation.
5In the early years of aviation, it could reasonably be said that the aircraft killed
the pilot.  That is, the aircraft were mechanically unsafe.  However, the modern era
of aviation has witnessed the reversal of the situation.  In the latest generation of
helicopters, technology has placed in our hands very capable machines.  It now
appears that the aircrew themselves are more deadly than the aircraft they fly.  In
fact, studies indicate that between 70 and 80 percent of aviation accidents can be
attributed to human error (O'Hare, 2002).
Current study investigates similarities and differences between expert and non-
experts.  Instructor pilots of Aviation School are used as the expert sample and
candidate pilots with flight experience of less than 100 hours constitute the non-
expert sample.  Since all the questions in the questionnaire are related to aviation,
there is a high match between experts and risk domain.  One major difference of
our study from earlier ones is that our non-expert sample is also familiar with the
risk domain. In previous studies, novice sample is generally formed from public,
whereas our non-expert sample also has flight experience and this provided us to
reach better and reliable results.
Accordingly, this thesis is organized as follows:  A review of literature on risk
perception, including  revealed preference approach, psychometric approach,
cultural theory, and heuristics and biases is given in Chapter 2.  To explore
differences in risk perceptions of experts and non-experts, previous research is
detailed in Chapter 3.  In Chapter 4, methodology used in the study is explained.
6Chapter 5 covers the results of the study.  Finally, Chapter 6 covers the conclusions
of current work.
7CHAPTER 2
RISK AND RISK PERCEPTION
Understanding the concept of risk first requires an understanding of a hazard.
Hohenemser et al. (1983) describe hazards as “threats to humans and what they
value, whereas risks are quantitative measures of hazard consequences that can be
expressed as conditional probabilities of experiencing harm” (p.379).  Hall and
Crawford (1992) define hazard as an "activity or phenomenon that poses potential
harm or other undesirable consequences to people or things" (p.78).  In short, the
magnitude of a hazard is the amount of harm and the severity of consequences
resulting from that hazard.
As Ayton and Hardman (1996) have expressed “all of us are confronted by
risks; we all take risks whether we like it or not” (p. 168).  Since risk is about future
events, it cannot be sensed. It can only be imagined or analyzed (Sjöberg, 2000a).
Can this inescapable fact of life, risk, be defined?  Defining the concept of risk has
so far become a difficult issue, and useless according to Doderlein (1982; cf
8Singleton and Hovden, 1994).  Currently, there is no generally accepted definition
of risk.  Vlek and Keren (1991, cf Pidgeon et al. 1992, p. 94) list ten different
formal definitions, which are quite common in the literature, and these definitions
are listed below:
1. Probability of undesired consequences
2. Seriousness of (maximum) possible undesired consequences
3. Multi-attribute weighted sum of components of possible undesired
consequences
4. (Probability) ∗ (seriousness of undesired consequences ‘expected
loss’)
5. Probability weighted sum of all possible undesired consequences
(average ‘expected loss’)
6. Fitted function through graph of points relating probability to extent of
undesired consequences
7. Semivariance of possible undesired consequences about their average
8. Variance of all possible consequences about mean expected
consequences
9. Weighted combination of various parameters of the probability
distribution of all possible consequences
10. Weight of possible undesired consequences (‘loss’) relative to
comparable possible desired consequences (‘gain’)
The abundance of risk definitions is only one of the problems.  Furthermore, all
of those definitions refer only to abstract terms such as probability and loss.
9Accordingly, Doderlein (1982; cf Singleton and Hovden, 1994) suggest that we do
not spend time arguing about definitions without reference to their practical
usefulness.  Most psychological studies on risk are directed to find factors that are
affecting risk judgments.  Singleton and Hovden (1994) conclude “it is progress if
useful ways of exploring risk can be clarified without describing the topic itself”
(p.4).
2.1 Perception of Risk
“Risk perception involves people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgments, and feelings, as
well as the wider social or cultural values and dispositions that people adopt, toward
hazards and their benefits” (Pidgeon et al. 1992, p.89).  Slovic (1987) expresses that
“... technologically sophisticated analysts employ risk assessment to evaluate
hazards, the majority of citizens rely on intuitive risk judgments, typically called
risk perceptions” (p.280).  Slovic informs us that in 1970s few researchers
attempted to work on risk perception studies, but later they began to seek what risk
means for people and what factors affect perceptions of people.
It is argued that geography, sociology, political science, anthropology, and
psychology made valuable contributions to the risk perception approach (Slovic,
1987).  According to Slovic, geographical research concentrated on understanding
human behavior; sociological and anthropological studies showed that social and
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cultural factors deeply affect perception and acceptance of risk; psychological
studies helped us understand relationships between risk decisions and heuristics and
mental strategies that people use to assess the events; and the mediator effects of
social influences on risk decisions were discovered by studies on political science.
There are three basic approaches to study risk perception.  These are revealed
preference approach, psychometric approach, and cultural theory.
2.1.1 Revealed Preference
One of the approaches to determining the acceptable risks, for any given
product, technology, etc is the revealed preference method.  This method attempted
to find an answer to the question of  “How safe is safe enough?”.  Slovic (2000)
states that the revealed preferences approach assumes that “by trial and error,
society arrives at an essentially optimum balance between the risks and benefits
associated with any activity” (p.125).  According to revealed preferences approach,
people use historical and current risk data to reach a balance between risks and
benefits.
Starr defends the usefulness of this method, and tries to elicit the relationship
between risks and benefits via a number of studies and concluded that acceptability
of risk from an activity is roughly proportional to the third power of the benefits for
that activity.  Also, the public will tolerate more risks from voluntary activities
11
(such as smoking, swimming, hunting) than involuntary activities (i.e. electric
power, motor vehicles), roughly 1000 times, that provide the same level of benefits
(Slovic, 2000).
 
Lichtenstein et al. (1978; cf Slovic, 2000) replicated Starr’s studies in expanded
form.  Although there were some procedural differences, but they also produced
results similar to Starr’s.  Both found that there was a positive relation between
benefits and risks.  Starr had tried to demonstrate that people are prone to be riskier
in voluntary activities compared to involuntary activities.  Lichtenstein et al.  also
arrived the same results.
Despite the results of these studies, revealed preference method has several
negative aspects.  First of all, this method assumes that past preferences are good
predictors of present and future preferences.  It assumes that people have full
information and can use it optimally during decision-making process.  As a final
point, it is argued that (Slovic, 2000) “from a technical standpoint, it is no simple
matter to develop the measures of risks and benefits needed for the implementation
of this approach.” (p.128).
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2.1.2 Psychometric Approach
Deficiencies of Starr’s approach motivated Decision Research group to conduct
a study using questionnaires to measure the people’s attitudes toward risks.
According to Sjöberg (2000b), the first such study was launched in 1978 by
Fischhoff et al. (1978).  The term psychometric derives from the methodology
conducted to assess the risk perception of individuals (Module Handbook of
Caledonian University, 2001).  In psychometric studies, respondents are asked to
express their preferences for a range of hazards.  In the first study (Fischhoff et al.,
1978), respondents were asked to evaluate 30 activities and technologies with
regard to perceived risk, perceived benefit, the acceptability of its current risk level,
and were asked to rate each activity depending on nine dimensions of risk.
Slovic (2000) explains the reasons that motivated the group to use such method
as: the capability of extracting current preferences instead of depending on
historical data; being able to consider many aspects of risks; and ease of using
statistical methods.  More extensive studies, both in terms of scales and the number
of participants, followed this initial work.  One such study (Slovic, 2000) was the
one performed by Slovic et al. with 90 hazards  and 18 risk characteristics.
Slovic (1987) has identified two distinct types of public concern associated with
risks: concerns about the unknown, and dread.  Unknown risks are hazards
unobservable by the public.  Slovic (2000) labeled observability, knowledge,
13
immediacy of consequences, and familiarity characteristics of the risk as unknown.
According to Slovic (2000), dread risks are the ones “whose severity is believed to
be uncontrollable tend also to be seen as dread, catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal,
inequitable, threatening to future generations, not easily reduced, increasing,
involuntary” (p.141).  Nuclear power or nuclear weapons are examples of dread
risks.  Also for dread risk, (Slovic, 2000) the "higher its perceived risk, the more
people want to see its current risks reduced, and the more they want to see strict
regulation employed to achieve the desired reduction in risk" (p. 226).
Studies on expressed preferences showed that perceived risk is quantifiable and
predictable (Slovic, 1987).  Also studies elicited the point that people tend to view
current risk levels as unacceptably high for the activities given in studies.  Another
interesting outcome of the research is that people differ in terms of definitions of
risk concept.  Laypeople can make good estimates for annual fatalities, but their
judgment mainly depends on different characteristics such as threat to future
generations, dread, catastrophic potential, etc.  On the other hand, experts generally
correlate riskiness with expected annual mortality and they are influenced less by
the qualitative characteristics when compared to lay people’s judgment (Slovic,
2000).  For example, nuclear risk seems extremely high for lay people due to its
catastrophic potential, whereas it seems less risky to experts because the number of
deaths resulting from nuclear activities is relatively low up to now.
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Although psychometric approach has provided groundwork for the following
studies, it has also been criticized and some authors have claimed that this model is
not very powerful.  Several critiques against the psychometric model can be given:
1. Participants are not allowed to explain freely their ideas about the hazards in the
questionnaire.  Because they have to assess according to scales given by the
researcher.  Actually, this drawback is common to most psychometric methods.
So, outcomes of the research are influenced by the initial idea of the researchers
(Module Handbook of Caledonian University, 2001).  In fact, open-ended
research technique can be used to eliminate the boundary, but this time extra
levels of interpretation is needed to analyze data (Pidgeon et al. 1992, p. 106).
2. Factor analysis method does not yield differences between individuals (Pidgeon
et al. 1992, p. 106).
3. It has been criticized for using relatively small samples (Module Handbook of
Caledonian University, 2001).  However, subsequent studies tried to address
these criticisms and combined qualitative and quantitative methods.
4. Sjöberg (2000) criticized the model that since the authors analyzed only mean
ratings instead of raw data, model was capable of explaining perceived risk by
the factors present in studies and claimed “individual ratings should be of
primary interest” (p.4).
Comparisons of using aggregate data or individual data is examined my Marris
et al (1997).  They concluded that individuals vary in perception of the same risk,
and some strong correlations observed between risk characteristics are not so
15
powerful when the data analyzed at individual level.  But they also concluded that
although aggregate analysis may overstate some correlations between risk
characteristics, psychometric model is still reflecting the average of individual
responses and concluded that many of the qualitative characteristics proposed by
the psychometric model are closely associated with risk perceptions and model is an
effective method for analyzing risk perception.
2.1.3 Cultural Theory
One of the major attempts explaining risk perception is cultural theory.  Initial
study that tried to link risk perception with social and institutional arrangements,
rather than psychometric perspective, was introduced by the work of Douglas
(1966) and Thompson (1980) (cf. Pidgeon et al. 1992).  But according to Sjöberg
(2000), cultural theory gained widespread attention mainly with the publication of
Douglas and Wildavsky`s  ‘Risk and Culture’ (1982).  The claim of the cultural
theory is that human attitudes toward risk and danger are heterogeneous and vary
according to cultural biases.  An individual’s cultural bias is linked with the so-
called grid and group.  Grid refers to the norms and rules.  On the other hand, the
concept of group refers to the extent to which person becomes incorporated into
relationships with others.  By linking grid and group, four types of people are
specified:  hierarchists, egalitarians, fatalists, and individualists. Thus, each group
concerns with different types of hazards.
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1. Hierarchists:  Individuals who have a strong involvement (high group) and
follow the norms and rules (high grid) are called hierarchists.  Hierarchists like
organized society and worry about risks that affect authority and social order.
2. Egalitarians:  Individuals who have a strong involvement (high group) but score
low in grid scale (low grid) are called egalitarians.  They prefer a world in
which power and wealth are more evenly distributed (Slovic, 2000).
3. Fatalists:  Individuals who score low in group scale (low group) and score high
in grid scale (high grid) are called fatalists.  Fatalists are prone to think that
what happens in life is predetermined and cannot be changed.
4. Individualists:  Individuals who score low in group scale (low group) and score
low in grid scale (low grid) are called individualists.  They are autonomous and
like to control their own life.  They rely on individual skills and abilities.
Therefore, they are worried about factors that could threat the markets such as
war and recession (Sjöberg, 2000).
There have been some critics for this approach. Johnson (1987; cf Pidgeon et al.
1992, p. 113) claims that classifying people into four types may oversimplify social
differences present in the society.  Also Bellaby (1990; cf Pidgeon et al. 1992, p.
113) and Pidgeon (1996; cf Module Handbook of Caledonian University, 2001)
argue that the cultural theory is not considering changes in worldviews overtime,
and it undervalues dynamic aspects of social life.  Individuals might shift from one
type to another.
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One of the criticisms of this approach is that there exists little empirical
evidence to support the approach.  Although, a quantitative study has been
performed by Dake (1991; cf Sjöberg, 2000) and a qualitative study has been
performed by Rayner (1986; cf Pidgeon et al. 1992, p. 113) to analyze cultural
theory, it is argued that these studies are not sufficient (Sjöberg, 2000).  Sjöberg
(2000) claims that cultural theory is less successful than psychometric model and
less than 20% of variance of risk perception can be explained by this theory.
Despite criticisms, the cultural theory has made substantial contributions to risk
perception research and has provided different aspects of risk and tolerance.
2.2 Heuristics and Biases
The ability to interpret risks is limited by some factors.  When people are
confronted with complex tasks, they violate rational decision-making processes and
use heuristics to simplify the tasks.  Especially lay people, since they generally have
little statistical information on hand to contribute the decision making process, cope
with risk tasks by using heuristics.  Although heuristics are valid in some situations,
in others, they may cause biases and lead to serious conclusions (Slovic, 2000).
The three best-known heuristics are availability, anchoring and adjustment, and
representativeness.
18
2.2.1 Availability
It is argued that availability heuristic is one of the most important heuristics for
understanding risk perception (Kahneman et al, 1982).  The availability heuristic
suggests that an event is supposed to occur frequently as it is recalled or imagined
easier.  Actually, in our daily life, we remember the events that occur frequently.
For instance, the judgment that probability of being in a traffic accident in the city
is relatively high when compared to flood, because everyday an accident occurs in
our city.  Therefore availability is normal and often suitable and works well to
assess the probability in many situations.  However, in some circumstances using
availability heuristic might cause serious errors in decision-making.  Since factors,
not related to frequency (such as recency, familiarity, and emotional saliency), can
affect the availability and may cause biases (Slovic, 2000).
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) performed an experiment to study the availability
heuristic.  In the study, participants were told to judge the frequency of 41 causes of
death, including cancer, asthma, accidents, diabetes, and excess cold. Only the total
number of annual death for motor vehicle accident in U.S. was given (50,000) and
they were asked to judge the frequency of 40 remaining causes. In a paper (Slovic
et al, 1981), authors concluded that, “in general, rare causes of death were
overestimated and common causes of death were underestimated” (p.18).  For
instance, homicides were judged to cause more deaths than diabetes, whereas
diabetes actually causes more deaths.
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Another bias introduced by the studies (Sjöberg, 2000b) is risk denial.  There is
a propensity among people to view themselves as immune to many hazards.  People
make different estimates when they rate the risk to themselves and to others.  For
example, Sjöberg (1994; cf Sjöberg, 2000b) conducted a study with a sample of the
Swedish population where the respondents were asked to rate the risks (including
alcohol, smoking, pollution, accident, etc.) on a scale from 0 (no risk at all) to 6
(extremely risky).  Extreme differences were seen for risk ratings between general
risk and personal risk (Sjöberg, 2000b).  People think that they are less subjected to
risk than others.  For example, most of the drivers believe that they are better than
average drivers.  Slovic et al. (1981) claims that risk denial is one of the reasons
why people “refuse to take protective actions such as wearing seat belts” (p.20).
2.2.2 Anchoring and Adjustment
Another heuristic that is used in information processing is anchoring and
adjustment.  In this process, people make judgments by starting at an initial value
(anchor) and later adjust it to reach a final value as a decision.  Slovic (2000) states,
“…a natural starting point or anchor is used as a first approximation to the
judgment.  This anchor is then often adjusted to accommodate the implications of
additional information” (p.38).
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Authors suggest that this heuristic is insufficient to make predictions and
sometimes, if not generally, lead to wrong results.  The works of Tversky and
Kahneman (1974; cf Module Handbook of Caledonian University, 2001) and
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971; cf Slovic, 2000) tried to provide evidence for
insufficiency of anchoring heuristic, and succeeded it.  Lichtenstein and Slovic used
two pairs of gambles in experiment:
Bet A: 11/12 chance to win 12 chips
1/12 chance to lose 24 chips
Bet B: 2/12 chance to win 79 chips
10/12 chance to lose 5 chips
Participants were asked to make a choice between A and B. Later they were
asked to set a selling price for the ticket to play each bet if they had the ticket.
Results were challenging.  Although both alternatives were almost chosen equally,
bet B received a higher selling price.  In fact 87% of the subjects who chose bet A,
stated a higher price for bet B.
Lichtenstein and Slovic concluded that participants used different decision-
making processes when choosing the bet and setting a price for the ticket.
According to authors, participants justified the choice of A in terms of good odds,
but they set a higher price for B by using its high-return probability as an anchor.
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2.2.3 Representativeness
The last heuristic that will be mentioned in our study is representativeness.
According to Kahneman et al. (1982) “ a man who follows this heuristic evaluates
the probability of an event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is: (i) similar in
essential properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of
the process by which it is generated.” (p.33).
Representativeness approach leads to some biases.  One of them is insensitivity
to prior probability.  To investigate this, Kahneman et al. (1982) made an
experiment.  They wrote descriptions of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers by using
interviews and personality tests.  After having 100 personality descriptions, a group
of 85 participants was formed and five descriptions were given to each of
participants.  Before the test, participants were informed about the ratio of lawyers
and engineers (.7/.3).  One of the personality descriptions was the following:  “Dick
is a 30 year old man.  He is married with no children.  A man of high ability and
high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field.  He is well liked by
his colleagues.” Next, participants evaluated the probability of Dick being a lawyer
on a scale between 0 and 100.  Authors expected that the probability given by the
subjects would equal to the proportion of lawyers in the descriptions (.7).  But,
participants evaluated the probability of Dick being a lawyer as .5, contradictory to
real ratio.
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People also think that small samples represent the population, regardless of the
sample size.  This bias is called insensitivity to sample size. In fact variations in
sample size mean variations in statistical power.  As the size of sample decreases
statistical power of the sample decreases.  Kahneman and Tversky (1972; cf
Kahneman et al, 1982,p.6) studied the role of sample size, and gave the following
example in the book:
A certain town is served by two hospitals.  In the larger hospital about 45 babies
are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day.
As you know, about 50 percent of all babies are boys.  However, the exact
percentage varies from day to day.  Sometimes it may be higher than 50 percent,
sometimes lower.
For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60
percent of the babies born were boys.  Which hospital do you think recorded
more such days?
a. The larger hospital (21)
b. The smaller hospital (21)
c. About the same (53)
Kahneman and Tversky concluded that participants thought the events equally
representative of the population.  Actually, since the probability of deviation from
50 percent was less in large hospital, participants should have chosen small
hospital.  But numbers in parenthesis show that participants evaluated both small
and large hospitals as equal.
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Another bias resulting from representativeness is misconceptions of chance.  In
tosses of a coin, people generally evaluated the order H-T-H-T-T-H to be more
likely than H-H-H-T-T-T in the studies of Kahneman et al. (1982).  People expect
that even in small experiment, like in tosses of a coin for six times, fairness of the
coin will be seen.
One other bias is conjunction fallacy.  To illustrate this, Kahneman et al. (1982,
p.92) made the following experiment:
Bill is 34 years old.  He is intelligent, but unimaginative, compulsive, and
generally lifeless.  In school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social
studies and humanities.
Please rank order the following statements by their probability, using 1 for the
most probable and 8 for the least probable.
1. Bill is a physician who plays poker for a hobby.
2. Bill is an architect.
3. Bill is an account.
4. Bill plays jazz for a hobby.
5. Bill surfs for a hobby.
6. Bill is a reporter.
7. Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby.
8. Bill climbs mountains for a hobby.
24
They found that 87 percent of the 88 participants chose compound target, ‘an
accountant who plays jazz for a hobby’.  In fact, the description was representative
of an accountant, and unrepresentative of a jazz player.  As a result, Kahneman et
al. (1982) concluded “…the reliance on the representativeness heuristic led the
respondents to regard a conjunctive event as more probable than one of its
components, contrary to the conjunction rule of probability theory” (p.91).
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERT vs. LAYPEOPLE COMPARISONS
Considerable amount of research has been conducted to elicit the differences of
risk perception between experts and laypeople, and some researchers concluded that
laypeople perceive risk different than experts.  Some conclusions are as follows:
Even when experts and lay people have the same goals, they may be solving
different problems…other apparent differences of opinion between lay people
and technical people may be traced to differences in semantics. (Fischhoff et
al.1982, p. 248)
We found a substantial difference between the public and the ANS group with
regard to perceptions of risk from a high-level radioactive waste depository
program. (Flynn et al.1993, p. 646)
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When experts judge risk, their responses correlate highly with technical
estimates of annual fatalities.  Laypeople can assess annual fatalities if they are
asked to (and produce estimates somewhat like the technical estimates).
However, their judgments of ‘risk’ are related more to other hazard
characteristics…and, as a result, tend to differ from their own (and experts’)
estimates of annual fatalities. (Slovic, 2000, p.223)
Since position in a job environment or seniority does not mean expertise, before
trying to find the differences between experts and laypeople, we should first focus
on whether experts are real experts.  Bolger and Wright (1994) proposed that two
factors determine expertise:  ecological validity and learnability.  Bolger and
Wright (1994) define ecological validity as “the degree to which the expert is
experienced at making the type of judgment asked for by the researchers” (p. 19).
Authors also described learnability (Bolger and Wright, 1994) as “the extent to
which it is possible to master decision making and judgment in the task domain
under investigation, specifically by making use of feedback to refine reliable
domain models as a basis for subsequent judgment”  (p. 20).
Authors concluded that the quality of expert judgment mainly depends on these
two factors.  Both ecological validity and learnability should be high to get a high
performance.  They also expressed that some other factors, such as difficulty,
measurement type and power of tests, also affect the judgmental performance of
experts. These factors are given below:
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1. Task Difficulty:  Authors claim that difficulty affects the judgment and give pet
show example.  For example, “ an expert pet show judge should have no
problems discriminating between cats and dogs but might make mistakes
distinguishing between different breeds of cat or dog” (Bolger and Wright,
1994, p.16)
2. Measurement Type:  Reliability and validity are commonly used measurement
types.  According to Bolger and Wright (1994), “...reliability is a necessary, but
not sufficient, prerequisite for validity.  For example, a ruler which changes
length between each measurement is unreliable and consequently its readings
must be invalid.  However a ruler that consistently measures too short will be
reliable but...invalid” (p.16).  Authors conclude that reliable measure is more
convenient to get a good performance.
3. Power of Tests:  “Power refers to the probability of detecting an effect at an
acceptable significance level” (p.16).  Sample size and test sensitivity affect the
power.
Researchers dealing with expert-lay differences should focus on the points
explained above.  Because if the expert part of the study fails, it might lead to
wrong results for the whole study.  Many studies have been conducted about the
topic.  There are some discrepancies between the conclusions of these studies.  Here
we want to examine and give brief information about six studies to supply a
background for expert-lay differences.
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3.1 Study of Kraus et al. (1991)
Kraus et al. (1991)surveyed toxicologists and laypeople to demonstrate
discrepancies between these groups with regard to risk perception in chemicals.
They wanted to draw out which factors were causing differences between experts
and laypeople.  To accomplish that, they developed a questionnaire addressing the
four categories:  dose-response sensitivity, trust in animal and bacterial studies,
attitudes toward chemicals, and attitudes toward reducing chemical risks.  In each
category respondents faced several questions, and they evaluated questions on 4-
point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree).
360 questionnaires were mailed to members of the Society of Toxicology
(SOT), and 170 of them were returned (53 in academic subgroup, 58 in regulatory
subgroup, and 59 in industrial subgroup).  91 percent of the respondents had Ph.D.
degree and 2,4 percent and M.D. degree. Also 84,6 percent of the respondents were
male.  Lay sample was selected from the citizens of Portland, Oregon with the
minimum annual income of $20,000.  27 percent of mailed questionnaires were
returned, thus 262 people formed the lay sample.  These individuals were well
educated and had high income.
At the end of the research, it was concluded (Kraus et al, 1991)that in dose-
response sensitivity category, laypeople agreed more with the statement that “if you
are exposed to a toxic chemical substance, then you are likely to suffer adverse
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health effects” and “if you are exposed to carcinogen, then you are likely to get
cancer”(p. 217).  Two groups made different judgments in this category.
Results of the third and fourth category also drew out parallel results to category
1.  There were substantial differences between groups.  Only in the second
category, trust in animal and bacterial studies, responses of both experts and
laypeople resembled.  They differed only in one question that “if a scientific study
produces evidence that a chemical causes cancer in animals, then we can be
reasonably sure that the chemical will cause cancer in humans” (p.225).
Kraus et al. concluded that experts and laypeople differed in risk perception.
Laypeople had negative attitudes toward chemicals but positive attitudes and
perceptions toward prescription drugs.  Also “... lack of difference between the
public and toxicologists with regard to their confidence in extrapolation from
animal studies” (p.228) surprised the researchers.
3.2 Study of Barke et al. (1993)
Barke et al. (1993) concentrated on exploring nuclear waste process and
differences among experts and laypeople in risk perception on this issue.  Expert
sample consisted of 1011 scientists (members of the biology, chemistry,
engineering, geology, medical sciences, and physics sections of the American
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Association for the Advancement of Science).  Lay sample consisted of public
sample and Sierra Club members.  Public sample was obtained from Colorado and
New Mexico via telephone survey- for a total of 1153 individuals. Sierra Club
members were formed using a mail survey, totally 1506 members.
Knowledge of ionizing radiation, risk perception of potential hazards
concerning nuclear waste, political and demographic attitudes were some of the 70
items tested in the questionnaire.  Actually, since the main focus of the research was
to draw out variability of expert perceptions, they generally concentrated on why
each expert group (i.e. biologists, engineers, physicians) differed in attitudes and
behaviors for risk acceptance.  But it was also found that experts perceived less risk
than remaining two groups (public and Sierra Club members), and concluded that
there were significant differences between experts and laypeople in nuclear waste
risk perception.
3.3 Study of Flynn et al. (1993)
Flynn et al’s (1993) study also tried to find the differences of risk perception
between experts and laypeople with regard to high-level nuclear waste repository.
A questionnaire was prepared and distributed to 60 professional people joining a
meeting American Nuclear Society (ANS) held in Augusto, Georgia.  40 of them
completed and submitted the survey.  These were the expert sample.  Lay part of the
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study came from public surveys conducted by telephone.  The number of people
who completed the survey was not given in the paper, but Rowe and Wright (2001)
gives the number as 409.
The study consisted of three parts.  In the first part, participants were asked to
list three images or ideas that came to mind when they heard “underground nuclear
waste repository”.  The expert group produced 110 images; 31% negative, 20%
neutral, 49% positive.  The lay group produced 1200 images; 68% negative, 10%
neutral, and 22% positive.  Public images were generally negative such as danger,
death, environmental damage.  But images produced by experts were considerably
different.  They generally dealt with restrictions to building the repository, too
much money, etc.
In the second part, the participants were asked to express their opinions on 5-
point scales, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, for the statements
given in Table 1.  Both expert and lay samples gave similar responses for the first
statement and “ more than two thirds of each group somewhat agreed or strongly
agreed that accidents will occur” (Flynn et al. 1993, p. 646).  The responses to
second statement which was concerning the safety for future generations revealed
difference between experts and lay sample.  92.5 percent of ANS group agreed or
strongly agreed that nuclear waste repositories can be made safe while only 50.4
percent of laypeople agreed or strongly agreed.  Statement 3 displayed much large
difference.  Percentage of people who agreed or strongly agreed for this statement
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was 79 in laypeople while it was only 32.5 in expert sample.  Statements 4 and 5
drew out similar results with the previous statement that two groups differed greatly
in perception.  For Statement 6, once again, two groups gave different responses.
82 percent of experts agreed or strongly agreed that shipments of nuclear wastes can
be made safe from sabotage, whereas the percentage in laypeople for the same
responses was 35.  The last statement was concerning the reliability of U.S.
Department of Energy and 55 percent of experts agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement while only 21 percent of laypeople agreed or strongly agreed.
Table 1:  Opinions About Issues Related to the HLNW Repository Program
1. Highway and rail accidents will occur in transporting the wastes to the
repository site
2. Nuclear waste repositories can be made safe so that future generations will
not accidentally dig into the site looking for resources
3. A future earthquake, volcanic activity, or other natural phenomenon may
cause release of nuclear wastes to the outside environment
4. The buried waste will be contained in the waste site so that contamination of
underground water supplies will not occur
5. Accidents will occur in handling the materials during the burial operations
and result in contamination of workers or radioactive releases into the air and
ground
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Table 1 (cont’d)
6. Shipments of nuclear wastes can be made safe from sabotage or attack by
terrorists
7. The U.S. Department of Energy can be trusted to provide prompt and full
disclosure of any accidents or serious problems with their nuclear-waste
management programs
In the third part, participants were asked to evaluate the likelihood of outcomes
related to high-level nuclear waste repository program on 10-point scale, ranging
from 1 (not likely) to 10 (extremely likely), for the statements given in Table 2.
Both experts and laypeople had similar ideas for Statement 1 and 5, but differences
observed for Statements 2, 3, and 4.  Contrast was stronger for the item that “
activities at the nation’s nuclear facilities will in the future cause health problems
for those who live near such activities” (Flynn et al. 1993, p. 645). 8 percent of
expert sample rated as highly likely while 55 percent of lay sample rated as highly
likely.
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Table 2:  Likelihood Evaluation of Health and Benefit Items Related to the
HLNW Repository Program
1. A high-level nuclear waste repository will create a significant number
of new jobs in nearby local communities
2. How likely do you think it is that activities at the nation’s nuclear
facilities have in the past caused health problems
3. How likely do you think it is that activities at the nation’s nuclear
facilities will in the future cause health problems
4. A high-level nuclear waste repository will result in areas near nuclear
waste facilities being labeled ‘Nuclear Dump’ areas
5. A high-level nuclear waste repository will greatly increase revenues to
state and local governments
At the end of the study, the researchers concluded that remarkable differences
exist between experts and laypeople regarding the perception of radioactive waste
risks.  It was also concluded that two groups had “similar opinions only on
monetary issues unrelated to the special nuclear characteristics of a high-level
nuclear waste (HLNW) repository” (Flynn et al. 1993, p. 646).
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3.4 Study of McDaniels et al. (1997)
McDaniels et al. (1997) investigated the differences between expert and
laypeople risk perception concerning the human activities that would be ecological
risk to water environments.  To accomplish this, they gave a questionnaire to
participants.  Lay sample of participants consisted of 183 people (120 women, 81
men) from three residential communities and students from the University of British
Columbia. The number of students was 47.  16 experts working in aquatic sciences
formed expert sample.  Eight of them were professor at the university of British
Columbia, and the rest were resource management professionals at the Water
Quality Branch of the BC Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks.
Participants were asked to judge 33 hazards (such as acid rain, climate change,
flooding, commercial fishing) with 17 risk characteristics (i.e. knowledge,
controllability, scope, observability, human benefit, people affected) on 7-point
scale ranging from 1(low) to 7(high).
Researchers used factor analysis and found that four factors were affecting the
judgments of laypeople.  The first factor was impact on species which reflected
people’s concern about consequences of hazards to nonhuman species, and found
that it was positively correlated with risk perception.  Second factor was human
benefits.  This factor reflected benefits to humans resulting from hazardous
activities.  Risk perception was negatively correlated with benefits.  People were
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found to be prone to assess some events as less risky in case of high benefit.  Third
factor, avoidability, was reflecting the controllability of the event.  The last factor
was knowledge.  Researchers suggested that 80% of the variability in perception
could be explained by the factors given above.
They observed that only in 11 of the hazards (item 1, 2, 3, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16, 27,
29, 32), results showed significant differences between ratings of two samples.
Only acid rain, increased ultraviolet radiation due to ozone depletion, and leachates
from landfills were significant (at p<. 001) based on two sided t-tests.  Furthermore,
in 7 of remaining hazards (loss of fish habitat; agricultural waste disposal; urban
runoff; alterations of shorelines for development; hydropower development; septic
systems; introduced aquatic species; selective logging; canoeing, kayaking, and
rafting) experts rated risks higher than laypeople.  The authors concluded that:
People’s perceptions of risk are influenced by their assessment of the benefits
conversely associated with a risk item.  Thus, higher benefits derived from a
risk item tend to reduce the perception of general risk associated with the
hazard...experts see introduced species as relatively high in general risk need for
regulation, while the lay public does not. (McDaniels et al. 1997, p. 351)
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3.5 Study of Wright et al. (2000)
Wright et al. (2000) tried to examine discrepancies between expert and
laypeople perceptions concerning the U.K. oil and gas industry.  Experts were 21
loss-prevention managers in this industry who were the members of the U.K.
Offshore Operator’s Association (UKOOA).  All of them were professional
engineers and were making risk assessments.  Nonexperts consisted of two groups.
The first group was 31 managers who were following organizational courses or
part-time MBA programs. 30 students of business and economics program of
university were forming the second group.  Thus, total number of nonexperts was
61.
Participants completed a questionnaire including seven scenarios prepared by
UKOOA.  These scenarios were about hazardous events that would be faced in
industry.  Since the experts of UKOOA prepared the scenarios, there had been a
high match between experts and risk issue.  One of the seven scenarios was as
follow:
Scenario 2:  Most production platforms have ten or more helicopter flights in
and out per week.  They are utilized mainly to change crews.  A helicopter
crashes on its way from the shore to an offshore installation.  The helicopter was
in midflight, cruising in clear conditions at ~900 m when a Mayday was issued.
The coast guard mobilized a search and rescue.  There were no survivors. (p.
689)
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Table 3: The Sixteen Questions Asked for Each of the Scenarios
1. How much does society know about the risk associated with the scenario?
2. What is the potential for the events in the scenario to cause widespread
disastrous consequences?
3. How long has society known about the particular risk?
4. To what extent should the scenario’s occurrence serve as a warning to society,
providing new information about the probability that a similar, or even more
destructive, mishap might occur with this type of activity?
5. Given that the scenario occurs, what amount of effort (and money) should be
put into preventing its reoccurrence?
6. To what extent is the risk portrayed in the scenario known precisely by the
persons who are responsible for managing the risks?
7. Is the risk presented in the scenario a common one that people, in general,
have learned to live with and can think about reasonably calmly, or is it one
that people have a great dread for on the level of a gut reaction?
8. Can the risk portrayed in the scenario be controlled?
9. Does the risk portrayed in the scenario threaten future generations?
10. Are you, personally, at risk from an event of the type portrayed in the
scenario?
11. In your opinion, is the risk from an event of the type described in the scenario
increasing or decreasing as we move toward the year 2000?
12. In your opinion, can the risk from an event of the type described in the
scenario be reduced easily?
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Table 3 (cont’d)
13. In your opinion, if the event described in the scenario occurred, would the
media/press coverage be high?
14. To what extent do you trust those responsible for managing the risk described in
the scenario to act in society’s interest?
15. To what extent do you think that your evaluations of the risk portrayed in the
scenario will be close to those of oil/gas industry experts?
16. Overall, how would you rate the risk of the events described in the scenario?
After reading each scenario, subjects were asked to evaluate scenarios with
sixteen questions on 11-point rating scales.  Full set of questions asked to subject is
given in Table 3.
Wright et al (2000) expressed that evaluating less hazardous events, analyzing
those events in detailed form, and concerning hazards from only one area of human
activity were the issues that differed this study from earlier ones.  At the end of the
study, they found different results contrary to many of the outcomes of the studies
on differences in perceived risk.  One finding was that experts and laypeople share
more similarities.  Experts are also sensitive to risky situations, and they do not
judge the events as less risky than laypeople.  Finally, it was concluded that the idea
that experts and laypeople have differences in perception of risk should not be
generalized for all hazards.
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3.6 Study of Lazo et al. (2000)
Lazo et al. (2000) investigated 31 risk characteristics (such as species loss,
human suffering, media attention, how ethical, how controllable) for 13 global
climate change (GCC) and 12 non-GCC risks given in Table 4 to elicit the
differences of perception between experts (ecologists) and laypeople about
ecosystems.  They used factor analysis to reach conclusions by analyzing responses
given to questionnaire.  The participants consisted of 10 Pennsylvania State
professors and researchers who were expert in ecological science, and 16
employees of the U.S. Environment Protection Agency who were expert in ecology,
forming totally 26 experts.  64 students (anthropology, marketing, economics,
counseling psychology, and human development classes) and 182 people of
Pennsylvania were chosen arbitrarily to form lay sample by using random digit
dialing.  Participants evaluated 25 hazardous activities with 31 judgment scales by
using 7-point scales, ranging from 1(low) to 7 (high).
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      Table 4: 25 Hazardous Activities Asked for Risk Rating
1. Acid rain
2. Crop failures
3. Decreased rainfall
4. Depletion of ozone layer
5. Desertification
6. Development of land for
housing
7. Diseases
8. Extreme temperatures
9. Fireplaces
10. Frequent flooding events
11. Hunting of animals
12. Increased rainfall
13. Increase in severity of winter
storms
14. Outdoor recreation
15. Loss of plant and animal species
16. Mining
17. More cloudy days
18. More droughts
19. More intense hurricanes
20. Nuclear power plants
21. Pesticides
22. Sea level rise
23. Top-soil loss
24. Tourism and travel
25. Volcanoes
At the end of the study they observed differences between experts and laypeople
in terms of risk perception to ecosystems.  They suggested that “laypeople believe
scientists understand GCC risks to ecosystems and that the impacts are significant
yet manageable.  Ecosystem experts appear not to share this confidence” (Lazo et
al. 2000, p. 192).  They concluded that experts assess GCC risks as less
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understandable, less controllable, and more acceptable than non-GCC risks,
whereas laypeople judge GCC risks as worse than non-GCC risks.  Researchers
propose that experts are prone to strengthen policies to reduce uncertainities about
impacts.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
4.1 Participants
Two independent samples of participants were involved in this study. The first
sample was composed of 36 helicopter instructor pilots. Their mean flight
experience was 2371 hours (with a standard deviation of 969 hours). On average,
they had been flying for 9.7 years (range= 5 to 14 years). Since no female helicopter
pilot had the certificate of instructor pilot at the time the questionnaire was applied,
all participants were male.
The second sample was composed of 31 helicopter candidate pilots. Their mean
flight experience was 53 hours (with a standard deviation of 38 hours). All of the
candidates had been flying for less than 1 year. Three of the candidates were
female. Both instructors and candidates had the same educational background,
Turkish Military Academy and Army Aviation School.
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4.2 Procedure
A questionnaire was constructed and the two samples received the same
questionnaire set.  The questionnaire contained 22 questions in four major sections.
In the first section participants were asked their flight status, flight year and flight
time to collect information related to current position and experience of the pilots.
Since the education, gender, and income of the two samples were known, they
weren’t asked.
In the second section, participants were asked to rate the riskiness of incidents
given in Table 5.  They were told to assign risk values by giving a rating between 0
(no risk) and 100 (maximum risk).  The rationale for this section was to evaluate the
differences between two samples with respect to riskiness of incidents.
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Table 5: Thirteen Incidents Given to Participants
1. Tail rotor shaft breakage
2. Main rotor blade failures
3. Transmission system failures
4. Hydraulic system failures
5. Electric system failures
6. Wire/water/ground strike at NOE (nap-of-earth) flight
7. Power loss
8. Power drop
9. Loss of tail rotor thrust
10. Accidents due to excessive usage in hover/taxi
11. Spatial disorientation
12. Lightning strike
13. Birdstrikes
In the third section, participants were asked to rate each incident on fifteen
characteristics with7-point scales, each of which represented a dimension that has
been hypothesized to effect risk perception, similar to those found to be important
in studies of Slovic et al. (2000).  Full set of rating scales is given below:
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1. Centrality: To what extent is the incident important for flight safety
2. Controllability: How likely is it that the pilot can remain in control of the
helicopter in the event that this incident occurs
3. Severity of consequences-personal: How likely is it that an accident/mishap
resulting from this incident would cause severe injury or death to pilots or
passengers
4. Severity of consequences-property: How likely is it that an accident/mishap
resulting from this incident would cause a great amount of property damages
5. Importance of training: To what extent is the training important to lessen the
severity of the consequences or stay in control of the aircraft in case such
incident
6. Adequacy of training:  To what extent is the training level sufficient for such
kind of incidents
7. Importance of altitude: To what extent is the altitude effective on the
consequences of the accidents/mishaps
8. Importance of crew coordination: To what extent is the crew coordination
effective on the consequences of the accidents/mishaps
9. Familiarity: To what extent are the pilots familiar with this kind of incident
10. Effect of stress on the result:  To what extent is the stress effective on the
consequences of the accidents/mishaps
11. Effect of fatigue on the result: To what extent is the fatigue effective on the
consequences of the accidents/mishaps
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12. Effect of overconfidence on the result: To what extent is the overconfidence
effective on the consequences of the accidents/mishaps
13. Effect of maintenance on the result: How likely is it that the accident/mishap is
caused by technical reasons or material defects
14. Effect of night flight on the result: How likely is it that the consequences of
accident/mishap would become more severe if it would happen in night flights
15. Effect of technology on the result: To what extent is the level of technology
used in aircraft important for consequences
The answers from two independent set of participants were taken, and Mann-
Whitney tests were conducted to compare the answers and observe risk perception
differences between these two independent samples.
Finally, five hypothetical decision-making scenarios with regard to helicopter
operations, including violation of safety to some extent, were given to participants
and asked to choose one of the two given alternatives.  These questions were
planned to assess the differences in behaviors.  The samples were required to select
either a risk-taking or a risk-avoiding alternative. The first decision scenario
involved main generator failure;  the second, exceeding maximum allowable load
limits;  the third, NOE flight;  the fourth, heavy meteorological conditions;  and the
fifth, heavy meteorological conditions in formation.  Full set of questions used in
the questionnaire is given in Appendix.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 Overall Riskiness of Incidents
In question 4 of the questionnaire, we asked participants to evaluate overall
riskiness of thirteen incidents given in Table 5.  We hypothesized that µe = µn, and
used t statistics to test it.  The results of the t statistics are given in Table 6.
Table 6: T-test Results for Overall Riskiness of Thirteen Incidents
T P
1. Tail rotor shaft breakage 0.52 0.605
2. Main rotor blade failures -2.89 0.005
3. Transmission system failures 0.08 0.940
4. Hydraulic system failures -1.74 0.087
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Table 6 (cont’d)
5. Electric system failures -3.68 0.000
6. Wire/water/ground contact at NOE -0.39 0.700
7. Power loss 1.21 0.230
8. Power drop 0.14 0.886
9. Loss of tail rotor thrust -0.58 0.561
10. Accidents due to excessive usage in hover/taxi -1.42 0.160
11. Spatial disorientation 0.05 0.959
12. Lightning strike -2.55 0.013
13. Birdstrikes -2.75 0.008
The responses to question 4 showed that there was a remarkable agreement
between the answers of two groups, except three incidents.  These exceptions were
main rotor blade failures, electric system failures, and birdstrikes.  While experts
rated the riskiness of main rotor blade failures with M=60.42, non-experts judged it
as more risky (M=78.52).   Main rotor blade failures have some causes.  These are
design and manufacture faults, unnoticed accident damages, incorrect assembly
repairs, and ageing.  Incorrect assembly/repairs and ageing are generally eliminated
by good maintenance system.  The main sources of accidents are design and
manufacture faults and unnoticed accident damages.  But when we checked the
statistics of helicopter accidents in Army Aviation, we observed that only one
accident had occurred originating from main rotor blade failure, and the reason was
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design and manufacture fault.  We also observed that only 25% of the expert
sample (9 pilots) was in Army at the time the accident occurred.  It means that, 25
percent witnessed only one accident, 75 percent witnessed no accident during their
service resulting from main rotor blade failure.  On the other hand, since the main
rotor blades are the sources of lifting force, they are one of the generic parts of the
helicopter, and it seems reasonable why lay sample rated it as more risky.  Most
probably, available information on hand caused experts to rate main rotor blade
failures as less risky when compared to ratings of lay sample.
In electric system failures and birdstrikes, the results were similar to main rotor
blade failures.  While expert sample rated electric system failures with Me = 29.58,
lay sample rated as Ml = 48.87. also Me = 30.33 and Ml = 47.32 for birdstrikes.  It
is known that birdstrikes are responsible for millions of dollars in damage annually
to aircraft worldwide.  But most of the numbers come from fixed-wing accidents.
Relatively, slow speed of helicopters allow more time for birds to take evasive
action and also for pilots.   In aviation school, pilots are trained on bird hazards and
correct reactions are taught.  Aviation experts recommend pilots to climb when
encounter birds in flight, because birds’ panic response is to dive away.  Accident
statistics  for Army backs these recommendations, and no accidents resulting from
birdstrikes were reported up to now.  Similar results were also valid for electric
system failures.  Although electric system failures occur frequently, they do not
result in accidents.  Since  all those information were  available and very well
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known by expert sample, they judged the incidents mentioned above as less risky
contradictory to the judgments of non-experts.
5.2 Evaluation of Risk Characteristics
As mentioned previously, we asked participants to rate each incident with
fifteen characteristics on 7-point scales.  It was hypothesised that µe = µn , and
Mann-Whitney test was used to observe risk perception differences between two
samples at p< 0.01 significance level.  The results of tests are given below.
5.2.1 Tail Rotor Shaft Breakage
Test results are given in Table 7.  As the table indicates two samples differed in
centrality, adequacy of training, and effect of night flight on the result.
    Table 7: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Tail Rotor Shaft Breakage
W P
Centrality 1518.0 0.0005
Controllability 1141.5 0.0977
Severity of consequences-personal 1458.5 0.0287
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Table 7 (cont’d)
Severity of consequences-property 1446.0 0.0343
Importance of training 1342.0 0.4224
Adequacy of training 921.0 0.0000
Importance of altitude 1299.0 0.8001
Importance of crew coordination 1312.0 0.6787
Familiarity 1082.5 0.0128
Effect of stress on the result 1362.5 0.3124
Effect of fatigue on the result 1426.5 0.0748
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1281.0 0.9761
Effect of maintenance on the result 1341.5 0.3760
Effect of night flight on the result 1557.5 0.0004
Effect of technology on the result 1465.0 0.0192
Accident statistics for Army Aviation shows that in all accidents, resulting from
shaft breakage, nobody died and moreover, by chance, instructor pilots were in-
command in all accidents.  But these experiences did not lessen the anxiety of
expert sample, and they rated centrality with Me= 6.75, adequacy of training with
Me= 3.42, and effect of night flight with Me=6.22. Also, since the training is given
by instructor pilots, 3.42 is quite low and should be taken into consideration to
revise the training programs.  On the other hand, lay sample rated centrality with
Ml= 6.10, adequacy of training with Ml= 5.32, and night flight with Ml= 5.48.  In
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our opinion, lay sample also should have been understood the centrality of tail rotor
for safe flight.
5.2.2 Main Rotor Blade Failures
We had expressed before that two samples differed in overall riskiness of main
rotor blade failures.  But for risk characteristics, they differed only in ‘importance
of altitude’.  The results are given in Table 8.
   Table 8: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Main Rotor Blade Failures
W P
Centrality 1180.5 0.1755
Controllability 1447.0 0.0431
Severity of consequences-personal 1085.5 0.0204
Severity of consequences-property 1072.5 0.0125
Importance of training 1063.0 0.0105
Adequacy of training 1108.5 0.0442
Importance of altitude 1009.5 0.0013
Importance of crew coordination 1114.5 0.0506
Familiarity 1320.5 0.6008
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Table 8 (cont’d)
Effect of stress on the result 1314.0 0.6718
Effect of fatigue on the result 1262.0 0.8531
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1189.0 0.2910
Effect of maintenance on the result 1219.0 0.4526
Effect of night flight on the result 1271.0 0.9376
Effect of technology on the result 1256.5 0.7985
Expert sample judges that when the failure occurs, altitude has minor
importance on the result.  They rated altitude with Me= 4.25, whereas non-expert
sample rated it with Ml= 5.81.
5.2.3 Transmission System Failures
The results for responses to transmission system failures in Table 9 show that
two samples differed in three categories and lay sample has more confidence for the
safety of transmission systems.  Expert sample judged severity of consequences on
personal with Me= 5.78, severity of consequences on property with Me= 6.08,
adequacy of training with Me= 4.17.  But lay sample rated them with 4.55, 4.68,
and 5.68 respectively.  Statistical data confirm the anxiety of expert sample, since
almost every transmission system failures resulted with death or injury so far.  Also
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training programs, considering transmission failures, are inadequate.  These are
common causes of differences in risk perception of two samples  for transmission
systems.
Table 9: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Transmission System Failures
W P
Centrality 1473.5 0.0139
Controllability 1104.0 0.0359
Severity of consequences-personal 1593.0 0.0002
Severity of consequences-property 1634.0 0.0000
Importance of training 1074.0 0.0124
Adequacy of training 974.5 0.0003
Importance of altitude 1130.0 0.0674
Importance of crew coordination 1110.5 0.0426
Familiarity 1147.0 0.1098
Effect of stress on the result 1216.5 0.4659
Effect of fatigue on the result 1208.0 0.4069
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1195.5 0.3285
Effect of maintenance on the result 1336.5 0.4116
Effect of night flight on the result 1472.0 0.0185
Effect of technology on the result 1438.5 0.0479
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5.2.4 Hydraulic System Failures
Test results for hydraulic system failures are given Table 10 , and it is clear that
there is an agreement on this failure.  Hydraulic systems are very important for
safety and they generally have good design and many helicopters, especially
military ones, have auxiliary hydraulic systems to be used in case of emergency.
Also check valves used in hydraulic system of some helicopters enable pilots to
land safely even if the system completely fails.  Lastly, hydraulic emergency
trainings are performed frequently by pilots.  It seems that both samples are quite
aware of the safety of hydraulic systems.
Table 10: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Hydraulic System Failures
W P
Centrality 1348.0 0.4033
Controllability 1186.5 0.2644
Severity of consequences-personal 1371.5 0.2645
Severity of consequences-property 1314.5 0.6638
Importance of training 1266.0 0.8680
Adequacy of training 1081.5 0.0162
Importance of altitude 1192.0 0.2958
Importance of crew coordination 1191.5 0.2634
Familiarity 1128.0 0.0688
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Table 10 (cont’d)
Effect of stress on the result 1321.0 0.6098
Effect of fatigue on the result 1338.5 0.4718
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1252.0 0.7608
Effect of maintenance on the result 1284.5 0.9373
Effect of night flight on the result 1424.5 0.0758
Effect of technology on the result 1473.0 0.0149
5.2.5 Electric System Failures
We expected that two samples would not differ greatly for electric system
evaluation, and the results given in Table 11 support this assumption, except for one
issue.  Expert sample believes that training is not so effective for the result
(Me= 5.22), whereas non-expert sample believes that training is vital to decrease
the severity of the consequences.  Accident statistics support expert sample, since
no accident has occurred in Turkish Army up to now resulting from electric system
failures.  In fact most of  electric failures, it is possible to take guidance from flight
manual during emergency conditions.  Because electric system failures generally do
not require immediate reaction, pilots usually have enough time to open flight
manual and remember the correct emergency procedure.
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     Table 11: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Electric System Failures
W P
Centrality 1143.0 0.1060
Controllability 1417.0 0.0837
Severity of consequences-personal 1205.5 0.3835
Severity of consequences-property 1227.5 0.5496
Importance of training 1057.0 0.0066
Adequacy of training 1161.0 0.1526
Importance of altitude 1133.0 0.0859
Importance of crew coordination 1164.0 0.1713
Familiarity 1265.0 0.8791
Effect of stress on the result 1300.5 0.7936
Effect of fatigue on the result 1281.5 0.9715
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1273.0 0.9573
Effect of maintenance on the result 1257.0 0.7968
Effect of night flight on the result 1245.0 0.6954
Effect of technology on the result 1376.0 0.2140
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5.2.6 Wire/Water/Ground Contact at Nap-of-the-earth (NOE)
Nap-of-the-earth flight (NOE) is a flight technique in which the pilot must keep
the aircraft very close to the ground, following the contours of hills, trees, and all
other land features.  Often, the aircraft is within a few feet of power lines, trees, and
other obstacles.  At NOE flight the pilot must be in complete control of the aircraft,
and all obstacles must be avoided.  NOE flight requires high attention and quick
reflex actions to avoid accident.  NOE flight is the most exciting but physically
exhausting flying anyone could do in a helicopter.
Results of the evaluation of NOE flight are given in Table 12.  Samples differed
in four characteristics.  These were centrality, adequacy of training, importance of
crew coordination, and effect of maintenance.  While expert sample rated the
centrality with Me= 6.00, lay sample rated with Ml= 5.13.  Almost all of the
accidents, which occurred at NOE flight, resulted with fatal consequences.  Because
altitude is so low that it takes few seconds to reach the ground or water and pilots
have little time to take evasive action.  In last ten years, almost all NOE flight
accidents resulted with high numbers of death and injury in Army Aviation.  Only
in one accident, pilots and passengers were so lucky that after wirestrike pilots had
succeeded safe landing.  Expert sample concluded that training on NOE flight was
not adequate (Me= 4.33), but lay sample rated the adequacy of training with Ml=
5.65.Also, crew coordination has vital importance according to expert sample, and
they rated it with Me= 6.56, while lay sample judged it with Ml= 5.45.  One of the
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biggest difference in perception of two samples was the effect of maintenance.
Mean of expert sample was 1.97 and mean of lay sample was 3.06.  Historical data
support expert sample, because percentage of maintenance effect in accidents of
Army Aviation is zero for NOE flight accidents while pilot error is 85 percent on
average.
Table 12: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Wire/Water/Ground
Contact at Nap-of-the-earth (NOE)
W P
Centrality 1537.0 0.0013
Controllability 1127.0 0.0624
Severity of consequences-personal 1447.5 0.0256
Severity of consequences-property 1401.0 0.0825
Importance of training 1335.5 0.4376
Adequacy of training 1023.5 0.0023
Importance of altitude 1402.5 0.0796
Importance of crew coordination 1550.5 0.0005
Familiarity 1461.0 0.0280
Effect of stress on the result 1478.0 0.0113
Effect of fatigue on the result 1459.5 0.0180
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1456.0 0.0200
Effect of maintenance on the result 1031.0 0.0023
Effect of night flight on the result 1396.5 0.0772
Effect of technology on the result 1181.5 0.2498
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5.2.7 Power Loss
Most people think that a helicopter will fall like a rock and the rotor system will
stop once the engine fails.  This is a false assumption.  A helicopter can make
autorotative landing without any power from the engine.  Autorotation is the term
used for gliding a helicopter down after the engine fails.  Helicopter can be
cushioned to the ground effectively and landed without incident by autorotative
landing.  A safer autorotational approach depends on where you land and degree of
your skills and training.
Autorotative landing is the only way to save lives in case of power failures, and
considerable part of training programs are used to practice it via simulated power
failures.  But simulated autorotations have to be complemented in hover altitude to
prevent mishaps or accidents.  Only instructor pilots have the authority to finish the
landing at ground in training.  Expert sample believes that training should be
intensified to eliminate or lessen the risks with mean of 4.89.  The results are given
in Table 13.  Accident statistics show that no one died in power loss incidents
which were performed by instructor pilots in Aviation School.  But inexperience of
non-expert sample shows itself in evaluation of adequacy of training with mean of
6.19.  Another point of difference distinguishing experts from non-experts is ‘effect
of technology on the result’.  Expert sample judges technology as more important
(Me= 6.36) when compared to judgment of non-expert sample (Ml= 5.61).
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   Table 13: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Power Loss
W P
Centrality 1444.5 0.0210
Controllability 1244.0 0.6822
Severity of consequences-personal 1373.0 0.2459
Severity of consequences-property 1415.5 0.0917
Importance of training 1160.0 0.0869
Adequacy of training 974.5 0.0002
Importance of altitude 1377.0 0.1200
Importance of crew coordination 1339.0 0.4429
Familiarity 1079.0 0.0169
Effect of stress on the result 1443.0 0.0448
Effect of fatigue on the result 1413.5 0.1012
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1323.5 0.5872
Effect of maintenance on the result 1340.0 0.4057
Effect of night flight on the result 1459.0 0.0185
Effect of technology on the result 1510.0 0.0031
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5.2.8 Power Drop
Power drop failures are similar to power loss.  But in this case, instead of losing
all power, pilots have some power to use while landing.  The quality of landing
depends on the magnitude of the power drop, adequacy of pilots,  and the surface
pilots are landing to.
Results given in Table 14 clarify that expert sample differed in adequacy of
training, effect of stress, effect of fatigue, and effect of technology.  But this time
while experts rated training with mean of  5.00, non-experts rated it with mean of
6.19.  The rationale behind the evaluation of experts most probably would be the
fact that simulated power failures hold important part of the training programs.
Table 14: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Power Drop
W P
Centrality 1421.0 0.0833
Controllability 1082.0 0.0164
Severity of consequences-personal 1418.0 0.0947
Severity of consequences-property 1396.5 0.1556
Importance of training 1151.0 0.0828
Adequacy of training 951.0 0.0001
Importance of altitude 1357.0 0.2966
64
Table 14 (cont’d)
Importance of crew coordination 1329.5 0.5273
Familiarity 1156.0 0.1427
Effect of stress on the result 1520.0 0.0036
Effect of fatigue on the result 1547.5 0.0011
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1380.5 0.2189
Effect of maintenance on the result 1389.5 0.1469
Effect of night flight on the result 1478.0 0.0127
Effect of technology on the result 1508.5 0.0041
Stress and fatigue also affect the results of failures according to experts with
means of 5.83 and 5.86 respectively.  Non-expert sample gave less importance for
them with means of 4.84 and 4.81 respectively.  Many people suffer from moderate
or severe stress and fatigue.  This adversely affects on-the-job concentration,
decision-making, problem solving, and performance.  Unfortunately, it is difficult
to know exactly how many mishaps or accidents are the direct results  of stress and
fatigue.  However, there is mounting evidence that stress and fatigue have reached
alarming levels in aviation.  In recent years, accident investigation experts began to
deal with stress and fatigue, and effect of fatigue reached to 5% in accident reports.
Like in power loss, expert sample has judged technology as more important
(Me= 6.22) when compared to judgment of non-expert sample (Ml= 5.42).
Technology especially shows its effect in latest versions of helicopters.  Because
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most helicopters, particularly military versions, have twin engines and failure of one
engine can easily be compensated by overperformance of other engine.
5.2.9 Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust
The tail rotor serves three functions.  It balances the torque of the main rotor, it
provides directional stability, and it is used for control.  Tail-rotor failures can occur
in several ways.  The most serious failure is the entire disappearance of the device
because of major structural failure.  The next most serious is the stoppage of
rotation after the severance of the tail rotor drive shaft.  Finally, the most survivable
failure is the loss of tail rotor pitch control following a severance or a jam in the
control system.  The ability to survive the entire loss of the tail rotor depends upon
the design of the helicopter and the flight condition at the time of the loss.
Differences in judgment of two samples include adequacy of training, effect of
fatigue, effect of night flight on the result, and effect of technology.  Results are
given in Table 15.   Again, while the non-expert sample rated adequacy of training
with a mean of 6.10, experts expressed that training was not enough and rated it
with a mean of 5.14.  Most of  the accidents resulting from tail rotor were faced by
instructor pilots and even in the worst cases no one died.  It is highly probable that
training affected the consequences of accidents remarkably.  Since tail rotor failure
emergencies require immediate action, high concentration, knowledge, and fatigue
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affects the performance of pilots.  Experts rated fatigue with mean of 6.14. But non-
expert sample evaluated it as less important (Ml= 5.00).
  Table 15: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust
W P
Centrality 1380.0 0.2110
Controllability 1076.5 0.0158
Severity of consequences-personal 1367.5 0.2850
Severity of consequences-property 1375.0 0.2425
Importance of training 1256.0 0.7604
Adequacy of training 1038.0 0.0035
Importance of altitude 1242.0 0.6625
Importance of crew coordination 1289.0 0.8993
Familiarity 1451.0 0.0380
Effect of stress on the result 1439.0 0.0515
Effect of fatigue on the result 1568.0 0.0004
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1480.5 0.0142
Effect of maintenance on the result 1143.5 0.1091
Effect of night flight on the result 1534.5 0.0020
Effect of technology on the result 1539.0 0.0013
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When loss of tail rotor thrust occurs at night, the results might be worse.
Because inadequate depth perception, difficulty of finding best landing area are
only some of the problems that pilots encounter in night flight emergencies.  Expert
sample rated ‘effect of night flight on the result’ with mean of 5.86, whereas non-
expert sample rated it with mean of 4.61.  Two samples also differed for ‘effect of
technology on the result with means of 6.31 and 5.10 respectively.  Changes in the
shape of vertical stabilizers and fuselages, and change in design gross weights are
some of new techniques to cope with complete loss of tail rotor.  For instance,
helicopters with large vertical stabilizers flying at high speeds cope best with tail
rotor failures.  It seems that experts took these developments into consideration
while judging technology.
5.2.10 Accidents due to Excessive Usage in Hover/Taxi
There was little difference in responses of expert and non-expert samples with
regard to accidents occurred in hover and taxi resulting from excessive usage.
Table 16 presents the results concerning excessive usage.  They differed only for
‘effect of maintenance on the result’, Me=2.06 and Ml= 3.71.  Actually, percentage
of maintenance in reported accidents is zero according to accident statistics of
Army Aviation.  So, experts evaluated the effect of maintenance better than
laypeople.
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Table 16: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Excessive Usage
W P
Centrality 1253.5 0.7706
Controllability 1247.0 0.7118
Severity of consequences-personal 1287.5 0.9145
Severity of consequences-property 1395.5 0.1590
Importance of training 1199.0 0.2453
Adequacy of training 1087.5 0.0184
Importance of altitude 1161.5 0.1455
Importance of crew coordination 1307.0 0.7276
Familiarity 1158.5 0.1498
Effect of stress on the result 1434.5 0.0583
Effect of fatigue on the result 1434.0 0.0550
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1381.5 0.2031
Effect of maintenance on the result 1039.5 0.0035
Effect of night flight on the result 1454.5 0.0309
Effect of technology on the result 1261.0 0.8424
69
5.2.11 Spatial Disorientation (SD)
Spatial disorientation is an individual’s inaccurate perception of position,
attitude, and motion relative to the center of the earth.  Featureless terrain, such as
dark areas and snow-covered terrain create illusion and pilots generally imagine
that altitude is higher than it actually is.  This illusion increases the risk of making a
lower-than-normal approach.  Confusion with ground lights and stars may also
cause to spatial disorientation.   Runways wider than normal create the illusion that
the aircraft is lower than it actually is.  Up-sloping runways or terrain create the
illusion that the aircraft is higher than it actually is, and leads to lower approaches.
Spatial disorientation plays an undeniable role in accidents, and is a significant
factor in aviation operations.  Continuing emphasis must be placed on identifying
appropriate control measures in education, training, research, and equipment.
However, the vital point in preventing spatial disorientation  related accidents is the
realistic training, both in the classroom and in flight training.
Experts and non-experts differed only for effects of overconfidence and night
flight on the result as shown in Table 17.  It seems instructor pilots believe that
more confidence means more accidents.  Actually, statistics show that pilots who
do not rely on instruments and try to fly with own feelings sometimes face S.D.
Probability of encountering illusions mentioned above in night flight is relatively
higher.  Poor visibility, decreased depth perception, increased fatigue are problems
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faced frequently at night.  Since non-experts have no night-flight experience, they
cannot predict the results as reasonable as experts.  Expert sample rated night flight
with mean of 6.33, whereas lay sample rated it with mean of 5.13.
    Table 17: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Spatial Disorientation
W P
Centrality 1346.0 0.3672
Controllability 1274.5 0.9709
Severity of consequences-personal 1346.0 0.4032
Severity of consequences-property 1420.0 0.0757
Importance of training 1313.0 0.6354
Adequacy of training 1086.0 0.0214
Importance of altitude 1346.0 0.3898
Importance of crew coordination 1385.0 0.1023
Familiarity 1132.0 0.0816
Effect of stress on the result 1454.5 0.0248
Effect of fatigue on the result 1392.0 0.1388
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1506.0 0.0037
Effect of maintenance on the result 1087.0 0.0105
Effect of night flight on the result 1509.0 0.0038
Effect of technology on the result 1475.0 0.0177
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5.2.12 Lightning Strike
Lightning can occur almost any time, but most often in clouds, within about
5,000 feet of freezing, in light rain and some turbulence.  Most lightning strikes on
helicopters occur below 6,000 feet.  It rarely occurs when operating below 1,000
feet above ground level (AGL).  The risk of a lightning strike to injure crew
seriously is relatively insignificant.  Typical injuries include mild electric shock
from the strike and temporary blindness from the flash.  Such blindness usually
occurs at night and lasts only 30 seconds or less.
There’s a chance that a lightning strike could cause physical damage to an
aircraft.  Lightning most likely strikes sharp or pointed areas, such as wing and
rotor tips, elevators.  Theoretically, a lightning bolt should pass through aircraft
metal structures without causing damage.  But that is not always the case,
sometimes burns aircraft skin and damage to wiring or electronic equipment.  For
aviators, the safest course of action is to turn away from a thunderstorm area.  To go
a few miles away out of flight route, or land and wait it out, is the smartest action.
Responses to lightning strike drew out the results given in Table 18.  Centrality,
severity of consequences-personal, severity of consequences-property, and
familiarity were the sources of differences between two samples.  Means of expert
sample were 5.25, 4.47, 4.92, and 1.83 respectively.  Responses of non-experts
were 6.35, 5.48, 5.74, and 2.65 respectively.  No lightning related accidents were
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reported in Army helicopters up to now.  So inexperience showed its effect in
responses of both samples.  Also responses to familiarity question proved this.  The
non-expert sample believes that consequences will be severe and lightning strike
affects helicopters very much in contrast to ideas of expert sample.
Table 18: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Lightning Strike
W P
Centrality 1036.5 0.0031
Controllability 1314.0 0.6716
Severity of consequences-personal 1005.5 0.0011
Severity of consequences-property 1019.0 0.0018
Importance of training 1123.5 0.0663
Adequacy of training 1127.5 0.0743
Importance of altitude 1096.0 0.0294
Importance of crew coordination 1117.5 0.0566
Familiarity 980.0 0.0002
Effect of stress on the result 1097.5 0.0308
Effect of fatigue on the result 1102.0 0.0363
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1139.5 0.0996
Effect of maintenance on the result 1132.0 0.0681
Effect of night flight on the result 1163.0 0.1724
Effect of technology on the result 1259.5 0.8294
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5.2.13 Birdstrikes
Birdstrikes have become a major concern and hindrance for both military and
civilian aircraft.  But as mentioned before, birdstrikes are especially important for
fixed-wings.  Slow speed of helicopters allow more time for birds to take evasive
action and also for pilots.  Test results are given in Table 19.  As the table indicates
two samples differed in importance of training, effect of maintenance on the result,
and effect of technology on the result.  Expert sample gave less importance to these
three items.  Means of experts are 4.42, 1.64, and 3.44; whereas means of non-
experts are 5.97, 3.13, and 5.03.
Table 19: Mann-Whitney Test Results for Birdstrikes
W P
Centrality 1259.0 0.8247
Controllability 1249.5 0.7321
Severity of consequences-personal 1213.5 0.4403
Severity of consequences-property 1308.0 0.7218
Importance of training 990.5 0.0006
Adequacy of training 1066.5 0.0113
Importance of altitude 1301.0 0.7877
Importance of crew coordination 1195.0 0.3211
Familiarity 1251.5 0.7550
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Table 19 (cont’d)
Effect of stress on the result 1306.5 0.7392
Effect of fatigue on the result 1282.0 0.9668
Effect of overconfidence on the result 1265.5 0.8864
Effect of maintenance on the result 1062.5 0.0057
Effect of night flight on the result 1136.5 0.0925
Effect of technology on the result 1051.0 0.0068
5.3 Risk-taking vs Risk-avoiding
Relationship between experience and risk perception provides another
interesting research theme.  Richardson et al. (1987, cf Barnett and Breakwell,
2001) identify experience “as a factor that determines how sensitive people are to
risks”.  Exploring the impact of experience in risk perception was investigated by
Barnett and Breakwell (2001), and they claimed that “experience constitutes an
individual-difference variable” (p. 175).  In our study, we wanted to see the impact
of expertise on risk taking behaviours. To accomplish that, we gave five decision-
making scenarios and asked both samples to choose one of the two given actions.
The samples were required to select either a risk-taking or a risk-avoiding
alternative.  The specific objective of this section was to assess the impact of
expertise on subjects’ propensity to take or avoid risks in hypothetical scenarios.
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For Scenario 1 (main generator failure) we obtained a significant difference
between two samples.  As asserted by Slovic (2000), “the basic question that risk-
benefit analysis must answer is:  is this product (activity, technology) acceptably
safe?” (p. 80).  Our findings suggest that experts judge this scenario acceptably safe
to save lives.  Results given in Figure 1 and 2 elicited that risk-taking propensity of
expert sample was higher than lay sample.  In fact, expert sample had also assessed
the riskiness of electric system failures as less risky.  Thus, responses to both
questions showed great similarities.
Main Generator Failure Assestment of Lay Sample
risk avoiders
55%
risk takers
45%
Figure 1: Main Generator Failure Assessment of Lay Sample
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Main Generator Failure Assessment of Expert 
Sample
risk takers
89%
risk avoiders
11%
Figure 2: Main Generator Failure Assessment of Expert Sample
For Scenario 2 (maximum allowable load limits) two samples did not differ too
much.  Exceeding maximum allowable load limits may cause power drop, loss of
tail rotor thrust efficiency, or some other negative consequences, and these may
result in accidents.  On the other hand, majority of the pilots have the capability of
both flying at night with or without night vision goggles.  Under these
circumstances, it is logical not to attempt landing and to make evacuation in night-
flight conditions, and both samples chose to do so.  Answers for this scenario are
given in Figure 3 and Figure 4.
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Limit Assessment of Lay Sample
risk avoiders
81%
risk takers
19%
    Figure 3: Limit Assessment of Lay Sample
Limit Assessment of Expert Sample
risk avoiders
69%
risk takers
31%
  Figure 4: Limit Assessment of Expert Sample
For Scenario 3 (NOE flight risk) samples showed considerable difference.
Results given in Figure 5 and Figure 6 clarified that laypeople were not so prone to
NOE flight as experts.  In the second section of questionnaire, when we asked the
riskiness of NOE flight, lay sample rated it as more risky in comparison to experts.
In fact, since no benefit is gained for the flight given in this scenario, NOE flight
doesn’t seem so acceptable.
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NOE Flight Assessment of Lay Sample
risk avoiders
87%
risk takers
13%
Figure 5: NOE Flight Assessment of Lay Sample
NOE Flight Assessment of Expert Sample
risk avoiders
67%
risk takers
33%
          Figure 6: NOE Flight Assessment of Expert Sample
In Scenario 4 (flight in heavy meteorological conditions) samples differed in
their responses again.  While 3 of 31 nonexperts chose risk-taking alternative, 11 of
36 experts chose risk-taking alternative. Over-confidence, experience, and risk
denial might be the rationales for the decision of expert sample.  Effects of over-
confidence and risk denial on decision-making process of pilots should be
investigated in further work. Results given in Figure 7 and 8 imply that nonexperts
are less prone to take meteorological risks.
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Meteorological Risk Assessment of Lay Sample
risk avoiders
90%
risk takers
10%
  Figure 7: Meteorological Risk Assessment of Lay Sample
Meteorological Risk Assessment of Expert Sample
risk avoiders
69%
risk takers
31%
Figure 8: Meteorological Risk Assessment of Expert Sample
Finally, results of the Scenario 5, given in Figure 9 and Figure 10, revealed that
two samples had similar notions for risks in formation flights. Actually, it is clear
that pilots care about survival of individuals in formation and do not want to take
the responsibility of others’ lives.  In the nonexpert group, no one preferred risk-
taking behavior, whereas only 8 percent of expert sample preferred risk-taking
behaviour.
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Formation Flight Risk Assessment of Lay 
Sample
risk avoiders
100%
risk takers
0%
 Figure 9: Formation Flight Risk Assessment of Lay Sample
Formation Flight Risk Assessment of Expert 
Sample
risk avoiders
92%
risk takers
8%
          Figure 10: Formation Flight Risk Assessment of Expert Sample
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1 Conclusions and Recommendations
This thesis investigates potential differences and similarities between the views
of experts and non-experts with regard to risk perception from rotary-wing
operations.  To reach more reliable results, the two samples were carefully selected.
Kraus et al. (19991) had concluded that “men and more highly educated persons
were somewhat less concerned about chemical risks- in general, responses of
college-educated persons were slightly more similar to responses of toxicologists
than were responses of persons with less education” (p. 228). To eliminate probable
differences resulting from gender, education, and socioeconomic status, we applied
our questionnaire survey only to Army pilots, not to commercial helicopter pilots.
Thus, expert and non-expert samples were matched on demographic characteristics.
Moreover, since non-experts were candidate pilots, they differed from public
samples used in earlier studies.  Flight familiarity of laypeople allowed us to see
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differences and similarities in risk perception with no doubt.  The nature of experts
were also important.  Experts were asked to evaluate incidents which were routine
part of their daily activities.  This allowed to supply ecological validity.  Questions
asked to experts really covered the domain expertise of experts.
Results of the present study found some differences between experts and non-
experts.  Some results contrasted with the findings of many of the earlier studies.
Striking findings of our study can be summarized as follows:
1. Experts and non-experts do not vary to much in their evaluation of the riskiness
of the same incidents.  In fact, they share more similarities in risk perception.
This result is parallel with the findings of Wright et al. (2000) concerning the
occurrence of hazardous events in oil and gas production.
2. Ratings for the given qualitative risk characteristics drew out divergences in
perception. Divergences generally concentrated on adequacy of training; effect
of technology, maintenance, and night flight; and centrality. Experts generally
perceive that occurrence of  incidents may result with accidents, and training
should be increased to decrease the number of accidents for the incidents
evaluated as central.  Experts also believe that maintenance system is working
well, but aircraft equipped with modern technology should be in operation.
Lastly, they perceive night flight as risky.  By contrast, non-experts are not well
aware of  centrality of incidents given in survey.  This would be the reason why
they evaluated the level of training as well enough.  Also, lack of accident
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statistics most probably caused them to believe that maintenance was an
important factor for the accidents happened so far.
3. Another inference from the current study is that conclusions of the previous
studies with regard to risk perception of experts versus laypeople may not be
generalized.  Because some factors such as test types used in studies, the nature
of expert and non-expert samples can easily lead to different inferences.
4. Experience of risk affects the perception of risk. Experienced people have more
tendency to take risks voluntarily. By contrast, non-experts do not want to
increase risk voluntarily.
Differences and similarities between experts and laypeople should be handled
carefully to narrow the gap between these groups and to consider some
organizational changes.  For instance, positive image of maintenance system can be
used to motivate people working in maintenance.  Also, ideas of experts concerning
adequacy of training should be searched in detail to redesign the training program.
6.2 Limitations of Current Study
Pilot errors are considered as a contributing factor in many aviation accidents.
Experience of the pilots can be thought as a central to the pilot errors in accidents,
but it is not the only one.  Other issues such as emotional well-being, skill level
should also be considered and impacts of those issues be investigated.  These were
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not handled in our study.  Also, Fischer et al. (1991) notice that “risk of concern
differed in plausible ways as a function of gender and generation” (p. 314), but
having few female pilots and narrow generation gap between two samples
prevented us to test the affects of gender and generation.
Sample structures can be evaluated as limitations of this study.  First, pilots,
especially candidates, might have given answers that would be considered as true
according to standards and procedures, thinking that negative test results might
effect them unfavourably.  Second, since our lay sample had flight experience, the
results should not be generalized for the public. It would be better to apply the
questionnaire to candidates at the beginning of training periods to draw out
conclusions for the public.  Another point is that our lay sample consisted of two
groups.  One group had been flying for one month (n=16, mean flight time= 17
hour), and the other group had been flying for seven months (n=15, mean flight
time= 93).  But instead of making distinction between these groups, all responses of
two groups aggregated and considered as one sample.
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APPENDIX
Questionnaire
1. Pilot Status
Instructor pilot (   )
Candidate (   )
2. Flight Year: ________ years
3. Flight Time: ________hours
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4. Rate the riskiness of 13 incidents given below:
Rating Scale: 0 – 100  (0:no risk, 100:maximum risk)
a. Tail rotor shaft breakage :
b. Main rotor blade failures :
c. Transmission system failures :
d. Hydraulic system failures :
e. Electric system failures :
f. Wire/Water/Ground Contact at NOE :
g. Power Loss :
h. Power Drop :
i. Loss of tail rotor thrust :
j. Accidents due to excessive usage in hover and taxi :
k. Spatial disorientation :
l. Lightning Strike :
m. Birdstrikes :
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Evaluate question 5 through question 17 by using the scale given below:
Scale: 1(not at all risky); 7(extremely risky)
1        2        3        4        5        6        7
5. Tail rotor shaft breakage
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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6. Main rotor blade failures
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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7. Transmission system failures
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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8. Hydraulic system failures
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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9. Electric system failures
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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10. Wire/Water/Ground Contact at NOE
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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11. Power Loss
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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12. Power Drop
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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13. Loss of Tail Rotor Thrust
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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14. Accidents due to excessive usage in hover and taxi
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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15. Spatial Disorientation
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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16. Lightning Strike
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
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17. Birdstrikes
Not at all risky        Extremely risky
Centrality :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Controllability :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-personal :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Severity of consequences-property :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Adequacy of training :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of altitude :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Importance of crew coordination :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Familiarity :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of stress on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of fatigue on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of overconfidence on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of maintenance on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of night flight on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
Effect of technology on the result :  1       2       3       4       5       6       7
103
You are given five flight scenarios in following questions.  Please select one of the
alternatives given, which describe your probable reaction in such circumstances.
18. Main generator failure occurred during flight and you decided to turn back to
base.  On the way of flight to base, you receive a call and are asked if you can
evacuate casualties of traffic accident.  But performing this mission will take you
out of your route far away.  What would be your probable action?
a. I would suggest them to evacuate casualties by another vehicle due to failure in
the helicopter.
b. Since the defect in the helicopter is not so risky for flight safety, I would
perform the mission.
19. You are the pilot of search and rescue helicopter in earthquake region.  While
you are evacuating wounded people, you saw four extra wounded people.  But if
you land and load them, you will exceed maximum allowable load around 500
pounds.  At the same time the weather is getting dark.  What would be your
probable action?
a. I would not attempt to land in order not to exceed limits of the helicopter.  I
would rather try to evacuate them in night flight conditions.
b. I would attempt to evacuate them depending on my skills and experiences.
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20. You are flying around İstanbul / Şile for training purpose.  Meanwhile you
noticed young people who are waving their hands eagerly and want you fly through
them.  What would be your probable action?
a. I would continue to fly and avoid risk that would be caused by NOE flight.
b.  I would make NOE flight to salute them and make the flight more exciting.
21. You completed one-month mission period in Tatvan and you will go to Van to
board the airplane. But heavy meteorological conditions are getting worse and
visibility and ceiling are under limits.  You have two hours more to catch the plane,
and if you miss it you have wait one week more.  What would be your probable
action?
a. Although I would miss the plane, I would not take the risk and wait for the
better meteorological conditions.
b. I would attempt flying to Van to catch the plane and be at home in İzmir
depending on my skills and experiences.
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22. Under the conditions of question 21, if you were the leader of the formation
consist of three helicopters, what would be your action?
a. I would not take the risk and wait for the better conditions.
b. I would attempt flying to Van to catch the plane and be at home in İzmir
depending on my skills and experiences.
